Hi everyone,
In June, projects from four other organizations were linked to our practically dormant billing account (~$7/month) and ran GPU Compute Engine and the Gemini API on it for about eight days.
It was not a leaked API key: the attacker used an already signed-in admin session. The same actor also linked one of our projects to billing accounts that are not ours, so other organizations are likely affected too. Below are the timeline, why we didn’t see it, and what to check on your own billing accounts.
I’m Luděk, I look after Google Cloud at ModernTV, a Czech IPTV company.
Timeline (UTC, 2026)
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Dec 2022 – May 2026: the billing account is practically dormant, at most ~$7 a month.
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30 May, 22:55: in an already signed-in session of one of our administrators, the attacker grants itself a billing administrator role and adds two outside accounts as billing admins. The admin account was protected by 2FA with passkeys, but no new sign-in happened, so it never came into play.
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31 May, 08:44: Google flags suspicious activity on the account and signs the session out. The billing changes made through it stay in place.
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2–10 June: thirteen projects from four other organizations are attached to our billing account and run GPU Compute Engine (A100/H100) and the Gemini API.
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10 June, 09:31: we notice, contain it and close the billing account. Total: an amount in the high six figures (USD), in about eight days.
Why we didn’t see it
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Linking a project to a billing account is logged in that project. If the project belongs to another organization, the event never shows up in your own audit logs.
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The console listed 28 cost anomalies on that billing account between 2 and 9 June, half of them above 1,000 %. Not one notification about them reached us.
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Spend caps work per project, and these projects weren’t ours – they could also have had a spending history of their own, bypassing tier spend caps for Compute Engine.
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The Gemini spend cap paused only Gemini, at about $100,000. Compute Engine kept running until we closed the account ourselves.
What to check today (5 minutes)
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Billing → Account management: the list of projects linked to each billing account. Do you recognize every one? (Docs: “Enable, disable, or change billing for a project” – Enable, disable, or change billing for a project | Cloud Billing | Google Cloud Documentation )
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Billing account permissions: any principal from outside your own domain?
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Your own projects: is any of them linked to a billing account that isn’t yours?
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Billing → Cost management → Anomalies: open the list in the console, don’t rely on your inbox.
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Dormant billing accounts: close them or remove the payment method.
Two questions to the community
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Have you found projects from other organizations attached to your billing account, or your project attached to someone else’s? How did you notice, and how was it resolved?
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How do you protect admins against a hijacked signed-in session, when 2FA doesn’t help because there is no new sign-in? Shorter session lifetimes, device-bound sessions, separate admin accounts – what actually worked for you?
If you want to compare notes or need more detail to check your own setup, I’m available here to help.
Thanks for reading, and stay safe!
Luděk Svoboda
This is what worries me from the business side: the alerts exist, but they go to whoever holds a billing role in the console — not to the people who actually pay the invoice. In most companies finance learns about it when the bill arrives.
Two questions for Google:
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Can cost anomaly notifications be sent to a finance or management contact who doesn’t use the console at all?
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Is there a way to stop projects from outside our own organization from being linked to our billing account in the first place?
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Can there be automatical rule, that any changes in billing account could be sent via email to admins to confirm?
Adding my support for a substantive response from Google here. Based on the timeline, this is not just an account-security question: the compromised session was terminated, but the billing permissions it created remained in place.
Honza’s questions deserve concrete answers. What supported controls can prevent foreign projects from charging a company’s billing account, and how can finance receive actionable anomaly alerts without being cloud administrators? A clear explanation of the available safeguards—and their limitations—would help many other customers, not just the affected company.
The bill grew because detection lagged the spend by weeks, not because the charges were hard to see.
Your account sat near $7 a month, then produced 28 anomalies between June 2 and 9. A $100 budget alert on that account would have fired while the total was still in three figures (and the Gemini cap paused spend near $100,000, so the gap was detection, not a missing limit).
Three checks I would put in place this week. First, set a $10 budget alert and a $100 budget alert on every dormant billing account, and send them to a finance mailbox through Pub/Sub (not only to billing admins in the console). Second, turn on billing export to BigQuery and run a daily check for new linked projects, new services, and day-over-day spend change. Third, close billing accounts you no longer need, and review the linked-project list and billing IAM each week.
On your second question, I have not seen a billing setting that blocks a link from another organization, so I would treat the alert as the control.
This is the pattern I keep seeing (I am Rodrigo, founder of Compare Cloud Costs): anomaly alerts reach the console, while finance learns about the bill from the invoice. Did support say whether the foreign projects were linked through a shared billing admin role, or through a different path?
Thanks, Rodrigo, that’s a useful checklist. I agree there is no setting that blocks a link from another organization.
To your question: support never described the path, but our audit logs do. On 30 May the hijacked admin session granted itself the Billing Account Administrator role on our billing account and added two outside @gmail.com accounts as billing admins. Those were the only outside principals with rights on the account. The links themselves don’t show up in our logs, because they’re recorded in the foreign projects.
One correction on timing: it was days, not weeks. The spend started on 2 June and we closed the account on 10 June, with the significant spending on the last days.
On alerts as the control, one caveat from our case: the billing admin role the attacker gave itself can also edit or delete budgets and their notification settings, and it held that role three days before the spend started. In our case the first signal was the IAM change on the billing account on 30 May, not the spend. So I’d add a fourth check: watch for new principals on billing account IAM, and send that alert somewhere a billing admin can’t switch it off.